Ontology as a Fundamental Approach to Consciousness

[samiaseo222]

George Berkeley (1685-1753) put forward a doctrine of mental monism, claiming that reality is fundamentally mental, and the physical world is a derived construct. This paper puts forward a defence of this theory, using a version of Berkeley’s semantic argument. We then ask: if we were to take Berkeley’s ontology of mental monism seriously, what implications would it have for the theory of mind? Furthermore, if we were to adopt an uncompromisingly Berkeleian ontology, would the resulting theory of mind help us to explain psi phenomena?
Source: Peter B. Lloyd

The Scientifization of Culture : thoughts of a physicist on the techno-scientific revolution and the laws of progress
In his Die Arbeit tun die Andern - Klassenkampf und job function email list Priesterherrschaft der Intellectuellen (1975), sociologist Helmut Schelsky advanced the idea that, generally, ideologists will hate technology because the latter causes people to get less dependent on the supremacy of nature. Viz. such "emancipation" will solve many problems for whose solution they formerly called on ideology, e.g., social or religious utopias. Hence the (unconscious) bias of the "priests": technology means "competition" for their salvations.

In SoC (especially section 19) such idea, inter alia, has been extended so as to also include people's dependence on the supremacy of "the group" and on uncertainties in our destinies - fundamental or not. E.g., think of chance encounters for finding mates, and of research into some possible hereafter. That is, dependence and uncertainty in these domains too will be welcomed by "idea mongers": they will be less than enthousiastic about large-scale transparent love markets as well as the research mentioned (and, actually, about red-thread progress at all) because these too could compete with their own "product".